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Abstract 
Development assistance is a significant mechanism by which major countries exercise influence in the 
global health arena. Of the major Asian powers, Japan has long provided significant funding, while China 
and India have primarily been recipients but are beginning to increase their funding roles. This article 
examines the amounts, channels, modes, disease allocations and the geographic focuses of their foreign 
health aid, and delineates the institutional structures that govern the formulation and implementation of 
foreign health aid policy in each of these countries, to explore what influence China, India, and Japan 
have and may develop in the global health arena. The article looks in particular at two focal lenses, 
sovereignty and institutional diversity, to understand what if anything is different from existing 
approaches to global health governance and what might be expected from these three key Asian nations 
vis-à-vis global health. 
Policy Implications 
 Japan’s global health leadership transcends its bilateral initiatives. The critical question that 
emerges now is whether Japan can sustain its will and capacity without clear policy direction 
from the current government amid domestic turmoil. What is to be done by Japan, and who will 
do it? 
 China and India have not engaged extensively with the global processes as donors. Yet, as 
recipients they have been open to a wide range of types of actors and relatively relaxed about 
sovereignty concerns, possibly providing a basis for a similar direction in development assistance 
for health (DAH) as their programs mature. 
 The domestic institutions responsible for external development assistance for health in both China 
and India would need to be substantially reformed and strengthened for these countries to have 
the capacity to play leading roles in global health governance in the future. 
 China and India increasingly have the capacity to invest greater resources in their own public 
health systems, which would redress some of the existing imbalances in allocations of global 
health finance. 
 Such domestic investment in domestic health care delivery would enhance India and China’s 
capacity to assume leadership roles and contribute towards innovations within global health and 
global health governance and augment their status as responsible and responsive global health 
stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
The burgeoning global health governance literature has as yet paid little attention to the current and 
potential roles of Asia’s leading powers. One way to better understand what if anything might be 
expected from India, China and Japan is to follow their money, via their foreign assistance dedicated to 
health. Japan is a long established major donor in the health arena, and China and India are expanding 
their international roles. Each enters the fray with its own agendas, priorities, values, and commitments 
that shape its international development and health assistance packages. In this article, we examine the 
health assistance programs of the three countries using two focal lenses – sovereignty and institutional 
diversity. 
These focal lenses are drawn from the larger study on global health governance on which this special 
section is based. As Tan et al. (2012) argue, the changing nature of state sovereignty and the growing 
number and diversity of actors relevant to global health governance are altering the global political 
landscape, and with it the incipient global health governance architecture. Thus, this article explores what 
their health aid programs may reveal about their evolving attitudes toward sovereignty as a principle, and 
about the institutions that have evolved in these countries that will contribute to GHG including, in 
particular, how these governments are prepared to engage with the plethora of relevant types of actors. 
We look to see whether there are distinctive national or regional ideas, values, experiences and 
conceptions underlying their approach to development assistance for health. 
To achieve these outcomes, the article is structured as follows. We provide brief snapshots of the 
domestic health contexts of each of the countries. The empirical section elaborates on the financing 
estimates of overall external global development assistance for health (DAH), with estimates of the 
relevant shares for China, India, and Japan. The next section expounds on the institutional arrangements 
for external health aid governance in the three countries, delineating the institutions responsible for the 
formulation and implementation of external development and health aid policy. We then analyse the three 
countries and their experiences through the lenses of sovereignty and institutional diversity. 
China, India and Japan’s domestic health contexts 
Examining the state of each nation’s domestic health systems enables us to place their foreign health 
financing patterns in perspective and provides us a more complete picture surrounding their foreign health 
aid practices. Three important metrics are considered – percentage of government spending in health care, 
nature of the national health delivery systems and major health challenges within each country. 
Government spending on domestic health care varies across the three countries. WHO statistics reveal 
that China spent 4.3 per cent, India 4.2 per cent and Japan 8.3 per cent of GDP on health in 2008 (WHO, 
2011). Japan’s single payment system of government set prices insures against spiraling cost increases. 
As a result, Japan recently ranked 22nd in the OECD in the percentage of health care expenditures to 
GDP (Ikegami, 2009). Until recently, government health spending in India and China had been declining. 
Health care was viewed more as an onerous burden than a productive investment (Bardhan, 2008, p. 934). 
Moreover, rising fiscal burdens on the state in the 1980s and 1990s forced Beijing and Delhi to pare their 
health systems. After three decades of declining health care spending, however, India and China have 
increased total government spending on health by roughly 1–2 per cent of GDP (Mahal and Yip, 2008, p. 
926). 
Second, the organizational structuring of the health care system also varies. Private health care dominates 
in India, with little governmental regulation or oversight. Recent estimates indicate that close to 85 per 
cent of primary health visits are in the private realm, even in the poorest areas (Hammer, 2007). In China, 
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the public system reigns, despite reductions in subsidies to public health facilities (Bardhan, 2008, p. 
934). Beijing has also permitted a parallel private delivery system to grow allowing hospitals to recoup 
costs that are not redeemable by state subsidies. This public-private divide has engendered a split system 
where the infrastructure and provision of the care is public but the practices of health care facilities and 
professionals are essentially profit seeking models, resulting in gross inequities in access to health care 
(Mahal and Yip, 2007, p. 938). The Japanese system is modeled on the Bismarckian standard – social 
insurance system that is jointly financed by employers, employees, and the government with services 
being delivered by a private health care system (Reid, 2009). The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
negotiates and sets prices with the insurance providers, who then provide different plans to their 
consumers. All Japanese citizens are bound by law to be insured (Reid, 2009). 
In all three countries, non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, cancer and heart disease form the 
bulk of the disease burden. Non communicable diseases rose from 41.7 per cent in 1973 to 74.1 per cent 
of all Chinese deaths in 2005 (Normile, 2010, p. 422), and caused 60 per cent of Indian deaths in 2005 
(Mahal et al., 2010). From 2005–15, China and India are projected to spend 0.9 and 1.5 per cent of their 
respective GDPs to curb heart disease, strokes and diabetes (WHO, 2010). China and India also continue 
to face daunting challenges regarding infectious diseases. In India, such diseases represent some 30 per 
cent of the disease burden (John et al., 2011, p. 254). UNAIDS contends that India has the third largest 
number of individuals with HIV/AIDS after South Africa and Nigeria (UNAIDS, 2010). Tuberculosis is 
resurging across the country, with 2 million new cases surfacing in 2009 and a disturbing presence of 
multi resistant strains of the pathogen (John et al., 2011, p. 255). John et al. (2011, p. 263) grimly note 
that, ‘India is a textbook case for anyone wishing to study infectious diseases’. China faces equally 
significant challenges on the infectious disease front resulting from the rise of SARS, avian flu and the 
resurgence of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS (Wang et al., 2008, p. 1598). 
Japan’s primary health challenges stem from non-communicable diseases. Cancer caused 31 per cent of 
all deaths in 2007, and heart disease 14 per cent (Government of Japan, 2010). Despite having the longest 
life expectancy in the world, and methodical improvements in health infrastructure, health systems, and 
standards that have substantially reduced their occurrence in Japan, infectious diseases do remain a 
significant threat, and preparedness for future pandemics remains a priority (Cyranoski, 2005, p. 237). In 
all three countries, ageing populations will pose significant challenges for health care delivery in the 
future, especially in Japan, where mental health problems afflicted 35 per cent of all Japanese citizens 
above the age of 65 in 2008 (Government of Japan, 2010). 
Global development assistance for health (DAH) 
The last two decades have been revolutionary for global health – new actors, new priorities, and a litany 
of new financial commitments from a multitude of sources. With emerging powers like China and India 
entering the fray as global health donors, mapping and documenting the flows, channels, modes, and 
volumes of global development assistance for health (DAH) has become more complex and more 
important. Despite the absence of a comprehensive tracking index for global health assistance, estimates 
collated from bilateral pledges, multilateral aid flows, private philanthropic contributions and civil society 
estimates yield a fairly robust picture of global DAH and Asia’s contributions to them. 
Over the past two decades, health issues rose on the global agenda, a trend reflected in the quantities of 
foreign aid dedicated to health. DAH grew from US$5.6 billion in 1990 to US$10.51 billion in 2001 and 
US$21.79 billion in 2007, the latest year for which disaggregated data are available (Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation, 2010). Dodd and Hill estimate that global health aid consumed 10 per cent of 
overall ODA in 2005, rising from a little under 3.5 per cent in 1985 (Dodd and Hill, 2007, p. 3). 
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Governments provided the lion’s share of the global DAH commitments, giving US$15 billion in 2007. 
US commitments reached US$9 billion in 2007; Britain followed, pledging an estimated US$2 billion. 
Contributions from emerging nations (excluding China) approximated roughly US$520 million in 2006 
(McCoy et al., 2009, p. 409). Contributions from private philanthropic foundations reached roughly US$4 
billion in 2007; the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation alone accounting for roughly half that total 
(Ravishankar et al., 2007, p. 2119). 
Across the three countries, substantial portions of global health financing come from governmental 
sources. Despite being constrained by ever deepening fiscal burdens, Japan has maintained a high level of 
global health commitments. A rough estimate of Japan’s DAH was US$700 million in 2007; Tokyo 
continues to be one of the largest government contributors to the UN and the Global Fund for AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Pilcavage, forthcoming). Japan is also a major contributor to the World Bank 
International Development Association (Llano, et al., 2011, p. 1259). 
It is more difficult to obtain credible estimates of China’s overseas aid, given domestic political 
sensitivities in both Beijing and among its aid recipients about publicizing aid flows, inadequate inter-
ministerial information sharing and limited aid expertise in Beijing and the absence of a clear 
development aid system and lexicon within the Chinese government (Davies, 2010, p. 49). However, 
Wang et al. (2012) have estimated that commitments were on the order of US$300 million for 2007–08. 
India, like China, lacks concrete datasets detailing its global DAH contributions. However, one estimate 
by Devi Sridhar (2008) pegs India’s foreign health aid at US$226 million in 2007–08 (McCoy, 2009, p. 
409). From these rough estimates, it appears that China, India and Japan allocated approximately US$1.3 
billion for DAH in 2007 through their governmental arms, which then, roughly constitutes 6 per cent of 
the US$21 billion of global DAH in 2007. 
Financing by channel of health assistance 
An extraordinary array of actors shape and fund health across borders. Within the panoply we find not 
only national governments and their bilateral aid agencies (USAID, US Department of Defence, Peace 
Corps, DFID, CIDA, JICA, GIZ etc.), which provided the largest chunk (35 per cent) in 2007, but also: 
 intergovernmental organizations (WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, etc.) with another 
quarter of the total (US$5 billion) 
 regional Development Banks (ADB, AfDB, and IADB) (roughly US$365 million) 
 non-governmental organizations (Oxfam, CARE International, World Vision International, 
Family Health International, IPPF, etc.), which have become key funding channels accounting for 
some US$4 billion (McCoy et al, 2009, p. 409) 
 private philanthropic foundations (Rockefeller, Gates Foundation) 
 public-private entities (Global Fund, GAVI), which administered an estimated US$1.8 billion 
accounting for 9 per cent of global DAH in 2007 
 other regional (ASEAN, EU), inter sectoral (IHP) and plurilateral (IBSA) entities. 
Of the US$8 billion global DAH allocated through bilateral channels in 2007, the three Asian countries 
contributed US$0.85 billion, just over a tenth. Multilaterally, the Asian countries combined to provide 
US$0.45 billion or 4 per cent of the US$13 billion channeled through various UN agencies, World Bank, 
and regional development banks in 2007. 
Of the three, Japan has by far the most substantial track record as a donor. Its official health aid of 
US$700 million is split between bilateral and multilateral channels. Tokyo allotted approximately 
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US$186 million to the Global Fund, US$71 million to the WHO and US$150 million to the UN’s health 
apparatus. Bilaterally, Japan disbursed US$300 million (Pilcavage, 2012, forthcoming). In addition, the 
Japan Committee for Unicef raised US$124 million of private funds for UNICEF. Japan has been a 
crucial actor in the fight against polio, partnering with the WHO since 1975, providing US$22 million to 
WHO and UNICEF in the 1990s for the successful campaign to eradicate the disease in the East 
Asia/Western Pacific region (OECD, 1999), providing polio vaccines, cold chain system and surveillance, 
technical cooperation and research on poliovirus, and hosting 30 WHO Collaboration Centres and the 
National Institute for Infectious Diseases (which focuses on polio). In addition, Japan has been supporting 
the WHO Centre for Health Development in Kobe, Japan since its inception in 1995. 
China allocated approximately US$300 million in bilateral assistance, US$2 million to the Global Fund, 
US$18 million to the WHO and US$15 million to the UN’s health apparatus in 2007 (Wang et al., 
forthcoming). In addition to the US$226 million being administered by ministerial agencies in 2007, India 
gave the WHO US$3.7 million, US$5.2 million to UNICEF, and US$0.2 million to the Global Fund 
(Wang et al., 2012, forthcoming). 
Financing by mode of health assistance 
Ravishankar et al. (2009) further disaggregate global health financing into three types of health related 
assistance: in kind commodities in the form of drugs and medical supplies, in kind support through 
research, services management and technical assistance; and financial loans and grants. Sixty per cent of 
global DAH is allocated in the form of financial loans and grants amounting to US$13 billion in 2007, 
with the two forms of in kind transfers constituting the other US$8 billion or 40 per cent (Ravishankar et 
al., 2009, p. 2115). The WHO’s biennial budget of 2006–07 amounted to US$3.6 billion, with US$1.57 
billion being disbursed in the form of in kind technical support and assistance (Institute of Health Metrics 
and Evaluation, 2010). Another important point to note is the increasing overlap between broader 
overseas development aid and aid tied specifically to health. Non health ODA (e.g. in infrastructural 
form) can indirectly affect health outcomes and hence forms an important element of the health aid 
trajectories of the three countries being analyzed. 
Substantial portions of Chinese and Indian bilateral aid are in the form of in kind services. China’s Health 
Aid to Foreign Countries is primarily led through the deployment of Chinese medical teams (CMTs), 
construction of health facilities and hospitals, and the development of human resources in the health care 
sectors of recipient countries (Wang et al., forthcoming). Similarly, India’s preferred mode of assistance 
is technical assistance on overseas health projects. Programmatic data from the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs indicate a heavy concentration of foreign health aid directed through the construction of 
hospitals and clinics, deputation of medical and paramedical experts, and the development of water, 
sanitation, agricultural processing projects, etc. (Government of India, 2009). 
Although Japan continues to uphold a robust bilateral grant aid apparatus that imparts technical assistance 
abroad, it has assumed a more global role. As Pilcavage notes, Tokyo’s stewardship has proved seminal 
in the advancement of several vital global health causes – G8 Summits in Okinawa (2000) and Toyako 
(2008), HIV/AIDS, maternal, newborn and child health, Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis, etc. Japan has been engaged in regional cooperation, especially in terms of economic 
cooperation and trade since it began providing ODA, but Japan has been exerting efforts at establishing 
special regional health initiatives and funds, such as the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund to fight 
pandemic influenza. The ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action includes cooperation between ASEAN nations 
and Japan to address global issues such as combating infectious diseases and promoting human security 
(Pilcavage, 2012, forthcoming). Japan also engages in tripartite cooperation under the USAID-Japan 
Partnership for Global Health with developing countries, Japan also has the option of significant regional 
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influence via its leading role at the Asian Development Bank, where it was one of the two largest 
shareholders and a leading contributor to various special funds. All ADB presidents to date have been 
Japanese nationals. However, ADB funding for health has been quite limited, around 2 per cent in FY 
2008 and less than one per cent in FY 2009 (ADB 2008, 2009). 
Financing by diseases 
DAH tends to target specific diseases rather than broader strengthening of health systems, and Asia’s 
contributions follow the global trends. Disbursements allocated for HIV-AIDS ratcheted up from US$200 
million in 1990 to US$5 billion in 2007, a quarter of total DAH. Owing to several landmark global 
commitments, funding for maternal and neonatal health rose to an estimated US$3 billion in 2007. DAH 
for tuberculosis and malaria follow with estimates of US$1.5 billion in 2007 for each. Non communicable 
diseases, including cancer, diabetes, and heart disease constitute a small proportion of global health 
assistance amounting to US$125 million in 2007. Unspecified and other illnesses account for the other 
half of the global DAH. 
Examining funding by diseases reveal China and India’s split identities as both donors and (net) recipients 
(Japan is a net donor). Tokyo contributed US$186 million to the Global Fund’s efforts in tackling AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria in 2007, and pledged an additional 1 billion from 2005–09 through its Health 
and Development Initiative1 (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2005). China and India contributed 
a total of US$4 million in the same year. The two nations have received approved grants from the Global 
Fund totaling approximately US$2 billion, having already drawn roughly US$1.2 billion (Global Fund, 
2011). On the maternal and neonatal health front, Asia plays a peripheral role. China, India and Japan 
gave US$250 million to UNICEF, in effect, contributing 8 per cent of the global DAH allocated for 
maternal health (Wang et al., forthcoming). Japan, however, has advanced GAVI’s campaign in several 
other ways. Japanese investors, in alliance with GAVI and the International Finance Facility for 
Immunisation (IFFIm) have raised over US$1 billion for immunization and vaccination purposes through 
the issuance of vaccine bonds (GAVI, 2011a). Institutionally, JICA has also served as a base of 
operations for GAVI to deliver vaccination and immunization services in areas where optimal health 
delivery systems are wanting (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2011). Tokyo has also recently 
pledged US$9 million for 2011 in GAVI’s latest funding drive (GAVI, 2011b). 
Financing by regional focus 
The largest share of official development assistance for health globally goes to sub-Saharan Africa, which 
received close to US$5 billion or 25 per cent of the total global allocations in 2007. Some US$3 billion, 
or 14 per cent, was directed towards Asia (merging the East Asia-Pacific and South Asia). Latin America 
absorbed another US$2 billion. 
Japan’s health assistance dovetails with the global focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Japanese grants and 
technical assistance initiatives for health related projects in Africa have been incrementally rising since 
1990, aligning with the shifting global health consensus on eradicating infectious diseases across the 
continent. And, Japan has been hosting the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD), every five years since 1993. Economic growth in Japan’s priority region – Asia – reduced the 
need for assistance there and enabled Japan to shift its ODA to Africa, in line with Japan’s ODA charter, 
which focuses on humanitarian needs. However, some claim this trend in funding may have been driven 
by a strategic move for Japan to secure a seat on the UN Security Council and a possible endorsement 
from the African Bloc (Lehman, 2005; Pilcavage, 2012). 
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China has developed a robust relationship with the African continent in the last three decades through its 
overseas development assistance, including health. China has assisted in the construction of 133 
infrastructure projects, 38 hospitals, and dispatched over 16,000 medical personnel to Africa over the past 
fifty years to over 53 African countries (Davies, 2010, p. 56). According to Brautigam (2011, p. 4), 
China’s motives for its engagement in Africa have varied across the decades, reflecting the currents of the 
international political system and China’s role at those junctures (Brautigam, 2011, p. 4). In the 1960s, aid 
flowed to help African countries escape the ravages of colonialism. As ideological concerns waned from 
the 1970s, aid policy gradually became subsumed under commercial relations underscoring bilateral 
economic cooperation (Davies, 2010, p. 38). This focus intensified since the 1990s under the context of 
the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which prizes the concept of developing and sustaining 
mutually beneficial partnerships forged through South-South cooperation (Davies, 2010, p. 54). At the 
2009 FOCAC summit in Egypt, China pledged to ‘provide medical equipment and anti-malaria materials 
worth RMB500 million (US$73.2 million) to the 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment 
centers built by China and train 3,000 doctors and nurses for Africa’ (Brautigam, 2011, p. 6). 
Unlike Japan and China, whose aid generally dovetails with the global trend of targeting Africa, India 
directs most of its health related assistance to the South Asian region (Government of India, 2007). Delhi 
explicitly hopes these efforts will yield peace and advance amity within South Asia (Government of India, 
2010), and it may also reflect a desire to extend its commercial and strategic influence within the region 
(Price, 2011, p. 9). But India has concurrently maintained a marginal influence across the African 
continent since 1964 through two flagship training programs – Indian Technical and Cooperation 
Programme (ITEC) and Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP) 
(Government of India, ITEC, 2011). After having been forged under the context of decolonization and the 
incipient Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1960s, relations between Africa and India have matured 
to focus on mutual geoeconomic interests (Katti et al., 2009, p. 3). Recent Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs budget outlays (2010–11) to Africa reveal a spurt in the transfer of funds to facilitate 
technological development in sectors such as education, health care, tourism, across the continent 
(Government of India, 2010). Recent agreements formalized under the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) 
Tripartite Framework present another South-South forum for India to share its experiences, comparative 
advantages, and finances in the area of overseas health assistance (India Brazil South Africa Dialogue 
Forum, 2011). 
Institutional management of DAH in China, India and Japan 
As part of our focus on the global health paradigm, we are also interested in understanding the domestic 
institutions that shape national participation in global institutions. 
In all three countries, ministries of foreign or external affairs play a significant role in the determination 
of overseas development aid policy. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) coordinates the 
formulation of international development policy and ODA through an interagency process – the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Council, chaired by the Prime Minister. Inputs are drawn from a wide array of 
ministries and agencies, including ministries of finance, and ministry of economy, trade, and industry. 
Over the past two decades, MOFA has also engaged NGOs in the policy process through an 
interorganizational forum. On health aid policy, the MOFA and Ministry of Finance (MOF) function as 
the overseers with the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MOHLW) relied upon to supply technical 
counsel on global health issues. In addition, the government has drawn upon the expertise of academia 
and the think tank community, such as the Working Group on Challenges in Global Health and Japan’s 
Contributions (informally known as the Takemi Working Group). Within MOFA, the Global Issues 
Cooperation Division delves into the projects that focus squarely on health and bilateral assistance 
(Pilcavage, 2012). 
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Within the Chinese government, five institutions are considered crucial for foreign health aid – the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), MOF, Ministry of Health and 
the Export-Import Bank of China. The MFA is responsible for determining the quantity of aid to be 
allocated for a recipient country and it ‘drafts the annual plan for aid together with the Department of Aid 
in the Ministry of Commerce.’ It also ensures that China’s political interests are not subordinated to 
commercial considerations (Brautigam, 2009, p. 110). MOFCOM is a ‘designated central processing unit’ 
(guiko guanli danwei) and functions as the administrative manager of China’s foreign aid (Huang, 2011, 
p. 24). MOF determines the fiscal allocations for bilateral and multilateral aid initiatives. On multilateral 
aid pledges, a second department within the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the Department of 
International Trade and Economic Affairs (DITEA), manages the process (Wang et al., forthcoming). The 
Ministry of Health (MOH) manages the deployment of Chinese Medical Teams (CMTs) abroad. 
Furthermore, China’s State Council has recently established a coordinating mechanism, the Global Health 
Diplomatic Coordination Office to facilitate inter-ministerial cooperation on global health issues, 
including health aid (Chan et al., 2010, p. 5). 
In India, international development policy and the health aid agenda fall predominantly under the 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The Ministry of External Affairs is principally responsible for 
bilateral assistance (Price, 2011, vii). The MOF chips in to fulfill the attendant financial tasks involved 
and receives advice from the MEA on the eventual shape of bilateral assistance packages (Stuenkel, 2010, 
p. 39). MEA’s two technical arms – Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) and 
Special Commonwealth Assistance Programme for Africa (SCAAP) administer technical assistance for 
foreign development professionals seconded from their home countries (Government of India, MEA, 
2011). 
Managing and implementing foreign health aid policy 
Once the policies are devised, the institutions, mechanisms and processes instituted to manage and deliver 
health aid diverge in the three countries. Japan has established a relatively diffused, dynamic, receptive 
and multi stakeholder governance structure. At the forefront is the Japanese International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), an independent administrative institution that harnesses numerous governmental and 
quasi-governmental agencies to provide technical assistance and implement programs. (Pilcavage, 2012). 
Since the 1980s, many NGOs including Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Services (JOCS), 
Japan International Volunteer Centre, and national affiliates of international NGOs such as CARE and 
World Vision International have also collaborated in delivering health aid across the world (Pilcavage 
2012). Nonetheless, less than 1 per cent of Japan’s DAH is distributed to NGOs while over 40 per cent is 
channeled bilaterally (Llano, et al, 2011, p.1258). 
China hosts an institutional labyrinth of organizations managing overseas health assistance. In total, 22 
relevant ministries participate in the process of aid management and delivery (Wang et al., forthcoming). 
One arm of MOFA, the Economic Counsellor’s Office (ECO) operationalizes aid in recipient countries. 
Financial and budgetary estimates and allocations are undertaken by the MOF, which disburses funds to 
either the MOC or MOH (Wang et al. forthcoming). Other ministries and agencies such as Health, 
Science and Technology, Education implement aid activities in their respective fields. Specific aid 
projects in recipient countries are supervised by respective Chinese embassies, executed by the Ministry 
of Commerce and monitored by the Bureau of International Economic Cooperation, the Department of 
Aid to Foreign Countries and the Ministry of Commerce (Wang et al. forthcoming). Civil society 
participation is limited but expanding in China (Florini et al., 2012). As Wang et al. (forthcoming) note, 
prospects for greater civil society participation are good given their recent post-disaster relief works in 
several natural disasters (e.g., donations by the One Foundation in relief aid to Haiti and Italian 
earthquakes, etc.). 
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India’s institutional arrangements are less well understood. Since an overwhelming portion of health and 
overall development aid from India is channeled bilaterally, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) leads 
in managing and transferring development aid, including health assistance (Stuenkel, 2010, 38). Civil 
society’s role appears to be confined to aid delivery. Gomez (2009, p. 10) discerns a robust hive of NGO 
activity, especially in the prevention of HIV/AIDS, in partnerships with many global entities like the 
WHO, World Bank, Gates and Clinton Foundations, etc. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
appears to play virtually no role in overseas health assistance (Government of India, MOHFW 2009). 
Sovereignty and Institutional Diversity: Insights from the DAH patterns of China, India and Japan 
The development assistance programs of China, India, and Japan reveal interesting answers to the 
question of what might be expected from Asia in global health governance in the future, showing 
distinctive attitudes toward the concept of national sovereignty and rapidly changing attitudes toward the 
roles of a wide range of actors. Most strikingly, the rhetoric of all three countries displays a sensitivity to 
the national sovereignty of the recipients of their aid that western donors have only recently begun to 
emphasize. While all three certainly take their own national interests into account in deciding where and 
how to allot health assistance, the definition of national interest appears dynamic and contestable. 
When they are recipients rather than donors, China and India both seem quite open to the involvement of 
a wide range of nonstate actors. Since 2002, China has received financial support from the Global Fund to 
tackle HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, from DFID for the China-UK HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care 
program; from the National Institutes of Health for research on AIDS; from AusAID on developing 
community-based intervention programs in collaboration with Chinese Centre for Disease Control; from 
the World Bank on HIV prevention programs in various provinces; and from the Ford and Clinton 
Foundations to bolster the capacity of NGOs in mitigating the AIDS epidemic (Gomez, 2009, p. 18). 
Beijing has begun to push China’s private sector to contribute. In a recent summit hosted by the Ministry 
of Health and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Chinese former vice premier and acting 
health minister, Wu Yi, pushed the corporate sector to undertake a more forceful role in stemming 
HIV/AIDS; an unprecedented clarion call for many in the health community (Chan, 2009, p. 7). The 
SARS episode also affected and influenced China’s attitude to sovereignty. As Chan et al. (2010) 
describe, the crisis proved to be the accelerant to push through a series of public health reforms that had 
hitherto been politically unpalatable. Embedded under this shift is the increased space ceded to global 
health actors (WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF, etc.) and NGOs (GFATM, BMGF, Clinton Foundation, etc.) to 
help address infectious threats, notably HIV/AIDS. 
In India, donors like Global Fund, GAVI DFID, USAID, World Bank, Gates and Clinton Foundations 
have injected millions of dollars to support NGOs, state governments and the ministries of finance and 
health in Delhi to combat AIDS. Beijing and Delhi have given essentially free reign to these nonstate 
actors and their domestic partners within India and China in mitigating infectious diseases (Gomez, 
2009). 
As a donor, post SARS China invested greater resources in global health diplomacy through the provision 
of health assistance to areas ravaged by infectious diseases (Chan et al., 2010, p. 4–5). And more broadly, 
China’s recent white paper on foreign aid reflects an emphasis on the wishes of sovereign recipients: 
‘China provides foreign aid within the reach of its abilities in accordance with its national conditions. 
Giving full play to its comparative advantages, China does its utmost to tailor its aid to the actual needs of 
recipient countries’ (Xinhua News, 2011). Moreover, China and India both prefer to provide tangible in 
kind services in the form of technical and infrastructural assistance that bolsters the public health 
apparatus of the recipient governments such that they can progressively deliver health care to their 
citizenry, arguably enhancing their sovereign capacities. 
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India’s development aid programs demonstrate a preference towards reciprocity and mutual benefit. 
Where pertinent, it urges recipient countries to disclose their needs and requirements before pledging 
assistance. Gareth Price attributes this practice to the endurance of Nehruvian principles of 
nonintervention and self-sufficiency, which accord emphasis on state led development, itself borne out of 
India’s nationalist struggles. Delhi, however, has also displayed a penchant to focus more on projects that 
are practical in orientation, largely in the form of training and capacity building programs, whose impact 
sustains long after project completion (Price, 2011, vii-viii). 
Japan’s view of the principle of sovereignty appears particularly flexible. It demonstrates a strong concern 
for the sovereignty of its recipients, providing assistance on a ‘request basis’ known as the yosei shugi 
system, which places great value on the recipient countries’ sovereignty in a perspective on development 
policy that varies from Japan’s western counterparts (Orr, 1990; Lehman, 2005). There is an assumption 
in the ‘request basis’ system that the recipient countries have the ability to decide and protect their own 
interest, and the type of aid provided by the Japanese reflects a compromise between the parties. 
At the same time, as one of the chief material and ideational proponents of the human security paradigm 
since its inception, Japan has shepherded the emergence of a discourse that challenges traditional notions 
of national sovereignty and focuses on the individual rather than the country as the unit of concern, and 
Tokyo has enshrined its tenets within ODA policy (Pilcavage, 2012). It has propagated the human 
security discourse through high level policy speeches and symposia, mainstreaming the concept in 
bilateral and multilateral discussions, and funding grassroots human security projects that target victims 
of natural disasters, conflict areas, refugees and internally displaced people (Government of Japan, 2009). 
Japan’s leadership in several important global health campaigns – the 1994 Global Issues Initiative on 
Population and AIDS, the 2000 Okinawa G8 Summit that emphasized global health, specifically 
infectious diseases, the 2008 Toyako G8 Summit that highlighted health system strengthening and the 
MDGs, the Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICAD) that have been held since 
1993 – demonstrates a continuing commitment to global health governance. Japan has elicited the 
participation and insights of various domestic and global health actors in devising health policy, involving 
such entities as the Takemi Working Group, the Africa Japan Forum and academia. Japan has also 
championed the importance of strengthening health systems and health Information as a critical factor in 
health improvement (Government of Japan, 2008). 
The increased commitment of these countries, especially Japan and China, to global health governance in 
recent decades is also reflected by the efforts and resources they have invested in having some of their 
nationals elected to the top leadership of international health organizations such as the WHO. In 2009, 
Japan put forth resolution EB124.R8 at the 124th WHO Executive Board (EB) session and resolution 
WHA62.12 at the 62nd World Health Assembly (WHA), which were both on primary health care, 
including health system strengthening. This was the first time Japan initiated a resolution at the EB and 
WHA, and both resolutions were accepted. Similarly, China led EB126.R6 on birth defects at the 2010 
WHA. Curiously, India has been less prominent in this arena. 
But there are also elements of more narrowly defined notions of national interest at play. In their foreign 
health aid programs, all three countries rely heavily on their foreign affairs ministries, which by definition 
are the most likely to think in terms of sovereign interests when deploying foreign assistance. In China’s 
case, the MOFA and the MOC jointly determine the contours of health assistance. The MEA oversees the 
process of structuring and delivering health aid in India. In Japan, the MOFA functions as the principal 
arbiter in formulating aid policy through an interagency process, following which it delegates the 
responsibility of implementation to JICA and others. 
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Japan’s 2003 revised ODA Charter explicitly defined national interest as one of its ODA goals although 
in the past gaiatsu (external pressure), especially from the US, has played a part in the quantity of Japan’s 
ODA as well as its policies. Japanese foresight in hosting Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD) since 1993 enabled it to utilize TICAD as an instrument for Japan’s assistance 
and diplomacy to Africa. 
Chinese and Indian health assistance in Africa may also reflect national foreign policy aims. Although 
Beijing does not attach conditionalities to its assistance, China does expect token support on certain 
principles, particularly the notion of One China (Davies, 2010, p. 57). Similarly, Delhi refrains from 
conditionalizing aid, but it has deployed it to advance geopolitical imperatives in South Asia and geo 
economic interests in Africa. Infrastructural financing in Africa by the Indian government assists in 
facilitating market access for Indian companies across the continent and this financing line has been 
recently extended to an astounding US$5 billion over the next three years by the Indian government 
(Maasho, 2011). 
An overwhelming part of China and India’s DAH takes the form of bilateral aid. Although Japan’s 
experience over the past few years does herald a shift away from bilateral grants and aid, they do continue 
to employ it as evidenced by their pledged commitments, which hit US$300 million in 2007, which 
further indicates their comfort with maintaining the status quo despite being buffeted by recent crises 
(Pilcavage, 2012). It might be argued that the level of a country’s contribution to international agencies 
and the share of this in its total international aid provide a measure of a country’s commitments to the 
provision of the global public good, in a way that bilateral aid does not. On the other hand, the capacity 
for foreign aid of developing countries such as China and India has generally been limited, and bilateral 
aid may be a more efficient way to allocate that limited aid to countries and sectors which they know 
would bring greater benefits for the recipient countries. This would also imply that, with the rise of their 
economic power vis-à-vis today’s developed countries, one could and would expect them to increase their 
share of aid through multilateral channels. Indeed, Wang et al. (forthcoming) have shown optimism in 
that direction in the case of China. 
Institutional diversity 
Japanese officials also seem more willing than their Chinese and Indian counterparts to incorporate a 
broader range of actors in shaping assistance policies. In their largely bilateral health assistance programs, 
China and India focus on building the hardware of recipients’ health systems, providing badly needed 
infrastructure but not generally engaging the full range of actors in global health governance. 
The same attitudes toward nonstate actors hold true internally as well. Tokyo frequently avails itself of 
several nonstate actors that include NGOs, think tanks, nonprofit organizations, and academia in 
determining and deploying Japan’s foreign health assistance. Japan’s broadened its perspectives beyond 
its purely national interests to a more global perspective. However, less than 1 per cent of Japanese DAH 
is allocated to NGOs (Llano et al., 2011, p. 1258). On the other hand, China and India have been 
disinclined to allow much of a role for nonstate actors in their ODA policy, including foreign health 
assistance. This is reflected in the technical outlook of their international development and health 
assistance packages that only require calibration with their governing philosophies and agendas. It also 
prevents the establishment of a conceptual link with the governing episteme of the global health 
governance paradigm that stresses the interdependencies of global health. 
Understanding what DAH shows us about Chinese, Indian, and Japanese attitudes toward national 
sovereignty and institutional diversity as factors in global health governance is complicated by the reality 
that all three are large and diverse countries with complex domestic bureaucracies and interests all vying 
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to influence the direction of aid policy. As of now, India and China do not possess an independent agency 
for international development and cooperation. Policy formulation in India is concentrated in external 
affairs, whereas several agencies are relevant in China – commerce, foreign affairs, and finance. In both 
cases, institutional barriers make harmonizing national development and public health agendas with the 
global health paradigm difficult. Japan is a relatively coherent actor in health assistance, having vested 
responsibility for implementing aid policy with JICA (Pilcavage, 2012). 
The dual role of China and India as both recipients (with substantial health problems and domestic 
poverty) and donors (with robust economic growth, particularly in China) make it even more difficult to 
determine a sense of direction. As Global Fund statistics reveal, India and China have collectively paid 
US$26 million to date in assistance to the Fund (The Global Fund, 2011a). However, both nations 
currently possess approved grant amounts that total US$2 billion, with disbursals that collectively stand at 
over half a billion US dollars each (The Global Fund, 2011b). The Gates Foundation has pledged US$50 
million to China and US$338 million to India to combat HIV/AIDS. World Bank boosted its HIV funding 
to India by US$250 million in 2007 (Gomez, 2009, p. 10–11). Although such heavy use of available 
global resources may have made sense for two developing countries with such huge populations, health 
needs, and still-developing systems of domestic health governance, critics have argued that it distorts the 
process through which global funds are allocated to tackle pervasive health threats, siphons funding away 
from other low income countries, especially in Africa, that are decimated by these diseases, and places 
immense fiscal pressures on entities like the Global Fund, which is struggling to renew investments 
(Chow, 2010). In addition to pressure to reduce their role as recipients, they face growing pressure to 
increase their role as donors. GFATM Director Michel Kazatchkine recently appealed to emerging donors 
to take a more proactive donor role: ‘As these countries come in and play more political leadership roles, 
they have to enter into the global solidarity effort when it comes to health’ and ‘I really think it is time for 
the G20 to come into the circle of donors’ (Garrett and Alavian, 2010, p. 6). 
Conclusions 
Looking through the sovereignty and institutional diversity lenses to examine how the official health 
assistance programs of Japan, China, and India reveals a complex picture. Not surprisingly, there are 
immense differences across these three Asian countries and little evidence of a single coherent regional 
perspective on global health governance. 
Japan has engaged much more deeply with global health governance initiatives than have its regional 
neighbors, contributing far more to multilateral health programs and accepting influential roles for 
nonstate actors in its assistance programs. On the ideational side, Japan has contributed a human security 
paradigm that makes individuals, not countries, the focus of concern. 
China and India, in contrast, have benefitted substantially from multilateral initiatives to which their 
material contributions have been limited and their ideational contributions nonexistent. They have been 
receptive to receiving aid from nonstate actors but framing their own health assistance programs 
overwhelmingly in bilateral terms, focused around infrastructure and technical assistance, and not well 
connected to global health initiatives. Designating such ministries as foreign affairs and commerce to take 
the lead in formulating development policy leads to a scenario that David Fidler refers to as 
‘transformation of health for the benefit of foreign policy’ (Owen and Roberts, 2005, p. 1). Both India and 
China have remained tepid towards involving nonstate actors - major sources of experience and expertise 
- in the formulation of health oriented assistance. 
But these are dynamic processes. As we write, developments in each of the three countries appear poised 
to shape their future overseas development and health aid agendas. The triple disaster—earthquake, 
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tsunami and the nuclear maelstrom—that hit Japan in March 2011 has made Japan a receiver of assistance 
again, and will most likely affect Japan’s future budgetary allocations. Already in the red, Japan will be 
forced to reorganize its priorities to rebuild devastated areas, a scenario that may imperil future Japanese 
leadership on the global health front. The recent unveiling of China’s white paper on foreign aid (Xinhua 
Newsnet, 2011) officially proclaims China’s arrival on the international development stage, with an 
alternative approach to aid that institutionalizes the importance of mutual benefits and sovereignty, 
principles that have informed Chinese aid programs for the past three decades (Huang, 2011, p. 20). The 
recent establishment of a centralized foreign aid agency in Delhi, armed with a hefty financial and 
operational mandate, could enhance India’s management of aid and enable it to better manage its strategic 
interests via aid within and beyond the region (Patel, 2011). 
To date, these three countries have had limited roles in shaping global health governance. Japan has 
clearly had the most as demonstrated by the large amount of contributions to multilateral organizations 
and its hosting major forums such as the G8 Summit. In general, the three show greater rhetorical 
sensitivity to the sovereignty of the recipients of their aid than has be common with western aid, and have 
been less likely to direct their aid via nonstate or hybrid bodies. 
Although one could be tempted to draw comparisons between the approaches of China, India and Japan to 
those models of ODA adopted by the developed countries, this has to be done in the context of history 
and the reality that novel approaches are continuously evolving. Post WWII there was perhaps an 
underlying moral desire on the part of western powers to help countries which were former colonies in the 
developing world. This would partially explain the altruistic, multilateral and mostly ‘top down’ 
approaches of ODA that has developed in the last five to six decades, arguably starting with the Marshall 
Plan and the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Arguably, Japan as a former colonial power during WWII, has followed to some extent, the western 
model. In contrast, China and India were preoccupied with post war reconstruction and development and 
internal turmoil for much of the 20th century and have only recently begun to be involved in ODA in a 
meaningful manner. Having shared with the struggles of many Asian countries, and perhaps still a little 
wary of the domination of the western powers, India and China in particular, have approached ODA in a 
more bilateral and equal footing with underlying national self-interest, rather than the global common 
good, driving their policies. It also seems that the relatively small amounts of ODA allocated by these two 
countries, at least as compared to western nations, have been spent with a view on economic and security 
considerations which directly affect them. 
Based on the analysis presented in this paper, it would be reasonable to conclude that the approach 
adopted by India and China is, indeed, different to those adopted by the developed nations including 
Japan. The two models are not however, mutually exclusive, and one can imagine a future scenario where 
they are, in fact, complementary especially as both stronger capacity and institutions develop in China 
and India. The challenge in the future will be to strike the appropriate balance and to have governance 
mechanisms and structures in place to achieve this objective. As emerging economies mature in the 
coming decades, with concomitant increases in ODA, these aid programs are likely to significantly 
change the nature of global health governance hand-in-hand with more traditional approaches to ODA. 
Footnotes 
 This paper is based on case studies carried out in the Global Health Governance Study Group of the 
S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University 
of Singapore. The authors are grateful to the following contributors to that project, whose research 
helped to inform this article: Aravinda Guntupalli, Jenny Qu Wang, Minquan Liu, Aming Liu, Tao 
Wei, Hang Li. The authors also wish to extend their thanks to the anonymous reviewers on this paper, 
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and to the participants of two research workshops held in Bellagio, Italy in September 2009 and 
Singapore in June 2010. Additional thanks goes to the Rockefeller Foundation for its support of the 
Bellagio workshop. 
1 The HDI is another instrument in the Japanese MOFA's campaign against Infectious Diseases; it 
was designed as a successor to Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative, formed at the G8 Okinawa 
Summit. 
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